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Sysmon Logs

Hands-On Lab: Put this into practice with the Sysmon Lab and the Hayabusa Lab.


What is Sysmon?

Sysmon (System Monitor) is a free tool from Microsoft's Sysinternals suite. It runs as a Windows service and driver, and writes detailed activity to the Windows Event Log, far beyond what the built-in Security log captures.

Standard Windows logging can tell you that a process started. Sysmon tells you:

  • The full command line and the parent process that launched it
  • The file hashes of the executable
  • Which network connections the process made
  • Which files and registry keys it created or changed
  • Which other processes it touched, such as a tool reading LSASS memory to dump credentials

That level of detail is why Sysmon is a staple of threat hunting, detection engineering, and DFIR.


Where to Find Sysmon Logs

Sysmon events are written to their own channel:

Applications and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > Sysmon > Operational

Or, from PowerShell:

Get-WinEvent -LogName 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' -MaxEvents 20

The raw file is located at:

C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon%4Operational.evtx

Installing and Configuring Sysmon

Sysmon is driven by an XML configuration file that decides what gets logged and what gets filtered out. Without a good config, Sysmon is either too noisy or too quiet.

# Install with a config file
sysmon64.exe -accepteula -i sysmonconfig.xml

# Update the config on a running install
sysmon64.exe -c sysmonconfig.xml

# Check the current config
sysmon64.exe -c

Two widely used community configs:

Config Best For
SwiftOnSecurity sysmon-config A well-commented, balanced starting point
Olaf Hartong sysmon-modular A modular config mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Tip: Event ID 16 fires when the Sysmon config changes. An attacker changing the config to blind your logging is something you want to know about.


Sysmon Event IDs

Event ID Event What It's Good For
1 Process creation Command lines, parent/child relationships, hashes
2 File creation time changed Timestomping (attackers faking file dates)
3 Network connection Which process talked to which IP and port
4 Sysmon service state changed Sysmon stopped or started
5 Process terminated Process lifetime
6 Driver loaded Malicious or vulnerable drivers
7 Image (DLL) loaded DLL side-loading and injection
8 CreateRemoteThread Process injection
9 RawAccessRead Direct disk reads (for example, copying a locked NTDS.dit)
10 Process access One process opening another, such as credential dumping from LSASS
11 File created Dropped payloads, scripts, and tools
12 / 13 / 14 Registry object created or deleted / value set / renamed Persistence through Run keys, services, and more
15 File stream created Alternate Data Streams, Mark-of-the-Web
16 Sysmon config changed Logging tampering
17 / 18 Named pipe created / connected C2 frameworks such as Cobalt Strike use named pipes
19 / 20 / 21 WMI filter / consumer / binding WMI event subscription persistence
22 DNS query Which process looked up which domain
23 File delete (archived) Captures a copy of deleted files
24 Clipboard change Clipboard capture (when enabled)
25 Process tampering Process hollowing and herpaderping
26 File delete detected Logs deletions without archiving
27 / 28 File block executable / file block shredding Sysmon blocking actions (when configured)
29 File executable detected A new executable written to disk

Reading a Sysmon Event ID 1

Event ID 1 is the workhorse of Sysmon. Here are the fields that matter most:

Field Why It Matters
Image Full path of the executable that ran
CommandLine Exactly what was run, including arguments
ParentImage / ParentCommandLine What launched it, which is often the key to spotting malicious activity
User The account it ran as
IntegrityLevel Low, Medium, High, or System (High/System means elevated)
Hashes MD5, SHA256, and IMPHASH for threat-intel lookups
OriginalFileName The name compiled into the binary, which catches renamed tools
ProcessGuid A unique ID used to link this process to its network, file, and registry events

Example of a suspicious event:

Image:             C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
CommandLine:       powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -enc SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBi...
ParentImage:       C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE
User:              CORP\jsmith
IntegrityLevel:    Medium

Why this is bad: Microsoft Word should almost never launch PowerShell. Add a hidden window (-w hidden) and a Base64-encoded command (-enc), and this is a classic malicious macro pattern.


Hunting with Sysmon: Common Patterns

Suspicious Parent/Child Relationships (Event ID 1)

Parent Child Possible Activity
winword.exe, excel.exe, outlook.exe powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe Malicious macro or attachment
w3wp.exe (IIS) cmd.exe, powershell.exe Web shell
services.exe Random executable in a temp folder Malicious service
wmiprvse.exe powershell.exe Remote execution through WMI

Credential Dumping (Event ID 10)

Look for processes opening lsass.exe where the source process is unusual:

TargetImage:    C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
SourceImage:    C:\Users\Public\procdump64.exe
GrantedAccess:  0x1FFFFF

Access masks such as 0x1010, 0x1410, and 0x1FFFFF against LSASS from anything that isn't a known security product deserve a close look.

Living off the Land (Event ID 1 + Event ID 3)

Built-in Windows binaries (LOLBins) making network connections:

  • rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, mshta.exe, or certutil.exe connecting to the internet
  • certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http://... downloading a file

Persistence (Event IDs 12, 13, 19–21)

Registry values set under:

HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services

Command and Control (Event IDs 3, 17/18, 22)

  • Repeated connections to the same external IP at regular intervals (beaconing)
  • DNS queries to newly registered or random-looking domains
  • Unusual named pipes created by non-system processes

Pivoting with ProcessGuid

Every Sysmon event tied to a process includes a ProcessGuid. Use it to follow one process across event types:

Event 1  (ProcessGuid {A1B2...}) → powershell.exe launched by WINWORD.EXE
Event 22 (ProcessGuid {A1B2...}) → DNS query for evil-updates[.]com
Event 3  (ProcessGuid {A1B2...}) → Connection to 203.0.113.50:443
Event 11 (ProcessGuid {A1B2...}) → Created C:\Users\jsmith\AppData\Roaming\update.exe
Event 13 (ProcessGuid {A1B2...}) → Set HKCU\...\Run\Updater = update.exe

In five events you have the full story: initial access → C2 → payload drop → persistence.

# Pull all Sysmon events for a specific ProcessGuid
Get-WinEvent -LogName 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
  Where-Object { $_.Message -match '{A1B2C3D4-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}' }

Check Your Understanding

  1. Which Sysmon Event ID would show procdump.exe reading the memory of lsass.exe?
  2. An attacker renames mimikatz.exe to notepad.exe. Which Event ID 1 field could still reveal the original name?
  3. What field lets you link a process creation event to the network connections that process made?
  4. Why is excel.exe spawning cmd.exe suspicious?
Answers
  1. Event ID 10 (Process Access).
  2. OriginalFileName (and the file hashes).
  3. ProcessGuid.
  4. Office applications rarely need to launch a command shell. This is a common sign of a malicious macro or exploit.

Something not quite right? Let us know!

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