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What is Log Analysis?

Hands-On Lab: Put this into practice with the Hayabusa Lab and the Domain Log Review Lab.


Overview

Log analysis is the process of reviewing records generated by systems, applications, and network devices to understand what happened, when it happened, and who (or what) made it happen. For a SOC analyst, logs are the primary source of evidence. Alerts tell you something might be wrong — logs tell you what actually occurred.

Good log analysis lets you:

  • Detect malicious activity such as brute-force attempts, malware execution, and lateral movement
  • Investigate alerts by reconstructing the sequence of events
  • Scope an incident by figuring out which users, hosts, and data were affected
  • Prove or disprove a hypothesis ("Did this account actually log in from that IP?")

Anatomy of a Log Entry

Almost every log entry, regardless of the source, answers the same basic questions. On Windows, each event contains these core fields:

Field What It Tells You Example
TimeCreated When the event happened (stored in UTC) 2026-03-14T02:17:44Z
Provider / Source Which component wrote the event Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Event ID The type of event 4625
Computer Which host generated it WS-FINANCE-07
Level / Keywords Severity, or Audit Success / Audit Failure Audit Failure
Event Data The details: account names, IPs, process names, status codes TargetUserName: jsmith

Tip: Always pay attention to time zones. Windows stores events in UTC but Event Viewer displays them in local time. When you combine logs from multiple systems, normalize everything to UTC first.


Where Windows Logs Live

Windows organizes events into channels. The ones you will use most as an analyst:

Channel What It Contains
Security Logons, logoffs, account changes, privilege use, process creation (if audited)
System Service installs, driver loads, system startup and shutdown
Application Errors and info from installed applications
Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational PowerShell script block logging (Event ID 4104)
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational Detailed process, network, file, and registry activity (if Sysmon is installed)
Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational Scheduled task creation and execution

The raw files are stored as .evtx files in C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\.


Key Windows Security Event IDs

These are the event IDs you should know by heart.

Logon and Authentication

Event ID Meaning Why It Matters
4624 Successful logon Who got in, how (logon type), and from where
4625 Failed logon Brute force, password spraying, mistyped passwords
4634 / 4647 Logoff Helps define the length of a session
4648 Logon using explicit credentials runas, or an attacker using stolen credentials
4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon An admin-level account just logged on
4740 Account locked out Often the end result of brute forcing

Account and Group Changes

Event ID Meaning Why It Matters
4720 User account created Attackers create accounts for persistence
4722 User account enabled Re-enabling a dormant account
4724 Password reset attempt An admin (or attacker) reset someone's password
4728 / 4732 / 4756 Member added to a global / local / universal security group Privilege escalation (for example, added to Domain Admins)

Process, Persistence, and Tampering

Event ID Meaning Why It Matters
4688 New process created What ran on the box (enable command-line logging to see arguments)
4697 / 7045 Service installed (Security / System log) Common with PsExec and malware persistence
4698 Scheduled task created A very common persistence technique
4670 Permissions on an object changed Someone modified access control on a file or object
1102 Security audit log cleared Huge red flag: someone is covering tracks

Note: Event 4688 does not include the command line by default. Turn it on with the Group Policy setting Administrative Templates > System > Audit Process Creation > Include command line in process creation events.


Logon Types

Event 4624 includes a Logon Type field, which tells you how the user logged in. This is one of the most useful fields in all of Windows logging.

Logon Type Name What It Usually Means
2 Interactive Someone at the keyboard
3 Network Accessing a share, or remote tools like PsExec
4 Batch Scheduled tasks
5 Service A service starting under an account
7 Unlock Workstation unlocked
8 NetworkCleartext Credentials sent in clear text (for example, IIS basic auth)
9 NewCredentials runas /netonly, also seen with pass-the-hash tools
10 RemoteInteractive RDP
11 CachedInteractive Logon with cached domain credentials (for example, a laptop off the network)

Example: A logon type 10 for a service account at 3:00 AM from an unfamiliar IP is far more suspicious than a type 5 for the same account.


Failed Logon Status Codes

When you investigate Event 4625, the Status and Sub Status codes tell you why the logon failed.

Code Meaning What to Think
0xC000006A Wrong password Valid username, so a guess may be getting close
0xC0000064 Username does not exist Username enumeration or a typo
0xC0000234 Account locked out Brute forcing has already triggered lockout
0xC0000072 Account disabled Someone is trying an old or terminated account
0xC0000071 Password expired Usually a legitimate user
0xC000006F Outside of allowed logon hours Off-hours access attempt

The Log Analysis Workflow

Effective log analysis follows a repeatable process.

1. Know What "Normal" Looks Like

You can't spot an anomaly without a baseline. Learn the typical logon times, the usual admin accounts, which servers talk to each other, and which processes run every day.

2. Filter the Noise

A single domain controller can generate millions of events per day. Narrow down by:

  • Time window: start with the time of the alert
  • Event ID: only pull the IDs relevant to your question
  • Account or host: focus on the user or system involved
# All failed logons in the last 24 hours
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4625; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddHours(-24)}

3. Correlate Events Over Time

A single event rarely tells the whole story. Look for sequences:

4625 x 300 (failed logons, same source IP)
   → 4624 (successful logon, logon type 3)
      → 4672 (admin privileges assigned)
         → 7045 (new service installed)

That sequence reads as: brute force → success → admin access → persistence or lateral movement. Tools like Hayabusa make this much easier by building a single timeline from many logs.

4. Flag Anomalies

Common patterns worth investigating:

Pattern What to Look For
Brute force Many 4625s against one account, often ending in a 4740 lockout
Password spraying A few 4625s against many accounts from one source
Unusual logon times Successful logons outside business hours
Unusual logon types RDP (type 10) to servers that are normally only accessed over the network
New admin access 4728/4732 adding accounts to privileged groups
Log tampering 1102: security log cleared

5. Document What You Find

Write down timestamps, hosts, accounts, and event IDs as you go. A clear timeline is the most valuable thing you can hand to the next analyst or incident responder.


Check Your Understanding

  1. A host shows 500 Event ID 4625 entries for 500 different usernames, all from the same IP, within ten minutes. What attack is this most likely?
  2. What logon type would you expect to see for an RDP session?
  3. You find Event ID 1102 on a domain controller at 2:00 AM. Why is this concerning, and what would you look at next?
  4. Why might Event ID 4688 be missing the command line of a suspicious process?
Answers
  1. Password spraying: few attempts per account, many accounts, one source.
  2. Logon type 10 (RemoteInteractive).
  3. Someone cleared the Security log, likely to hide activity. Check the events immediately before the clear (if forwarded to a SIEM), the account that cleared it, and other logs (System, Sysmon) on the same host.
  4. Command-line auditing is not enabled by default and must be turned on through Group Policy.

Something not quite right? Let us know!

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